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Abstract
The importance of appropriate utilization of rewards for performance is still growing and there-
fore this type of rewards can be seen as a significant part of a total rewards package. Compa-
nies that are able to appropriately implement rewards for performance may gain competitive 
advantage over their competitors, but successful implementation requires a good knowledge 
of these rewards. The main aim of this paper is to contribute to the growth of this knowledge 
by identifying possible positive and negative impacts of profit-sharing on various areas that are 
important for the performance of a company, nevertheless, addressed are also macroeconomic 
consequences of profit-sharing. Furthermore, a comprehensive and up-to-date review of the 
relevant literature is provided, under-researched areas are identified and suggestions for further 
research are given. To accomplish these goals, we applied methods of bibliometric analysis to the 
articles indexed in ISI Web of Knowledge to identify the most important articles, authors and 
topics. According to our findings, the majority of studies report a neutral or positive impact of 
profit-sharing on productivity and profitability. This impact may be achieved by direct influence 
of profit-sharing on productivity of employees (due to the dependence of their pay on profit), 
but it seems that yet more important are various mediating mechanisms, especially effects on 
employment stability, absenteeism, quits and related issues, as well as effects on attitudes of em-
ployees and on relationships between employees. We argue that a well-designed profit-sharing 
plan is crucial for its success, but it is a relatively under-researched problem.
Keywords: rewards for performance, group rewards, profit-sharing
JEL Classification: M52
1. INTRODUCTION
In general it is possible to say that rewarding workforce for performance is a controversial topic. 
On the one hand, there is a broad consensus that only well-motivated employees can fulfill really 
ambitious goals. On the other hand, it is true that different people are motivated by different mo-
tivational factors (Havlíček, 2011, p. 185-186). Discussion is not only about which kinds of rewards 
for performance should be used, but also about intensity of utilization of these rewards. This goes 
especially for tangible rewards for performance and in this regard we can mention highly cited 
article “Why incentive plans cannot work” by Kohn (1993a), where Kohn expressed very negative 
attitude toward incentives and consequently was criticized by numerous proponents of perform-
ance-based rewards. What is important from the viewpoint of our paper is that Kohn (who is a 
fierce opponent of incentives) explicitly expressed an opinion that he had no objections against 
profit-sharing (Kohn, 1993b, p. 49). The question is whether and why profit-sharing (PS) really 
represents widely accepted (both in practice and theory) method of rewarding performance or 
whether it has its own flaws.
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Our main aim in this paper is to identify possible positive as well as negative effects of profit-
sharing on a firm and its competitive position. Another goal is to provide a comprehensive, 
up-to-date literature review. Last but not least, we want to identify the most important topics for 
further research as well as relevant methodological recommendations.
In the field of rewards for performance is terminology of individual researchers very diverse 
and domain of profit-sharing is unfortunately not an exemption. This, inter alia, significantly 
complicates attempts to summarize and compare results of various empirical (and even theoreti-
cal) articles because of different understanding of the term “profit-sharing” in these articles. 
This problem cannot be easily removed and only better methodological approach can turn the 
area of performance-related rewards into more cumulative research field. Here we give at least 
a broad definition of “profit-sharing” and also discuss relationship of profit-sharing to other 
group-based incentives.
Profit-sharing is a type of a group-based pay for performance with a long history. Very well doc-
umented cases of profit-sharing can be found e.g. in Britain from 1880; Matthews (1989, p. 439) 
even noted that “we know more about the extent of profit-sharing in 1880 than in 1980”. Broadly 
defined, profit-sharing can be understood as any rewards system, which directly links profits of 
a company in a particular period with compensation of employees in that period (Kruse, 1992, 
p. 24). The term “profit related pay” is often used as a synonym for profit-sharing (Coyle-Sha-
piro, Morrow, Richardson, & Dunn, 2002, p. 424), but sometimes are these types of rewards 
understood as being different, see e.g. Duncan (1988, p. 186). Another popular type of group-
based incentives is gain-sharing, which is usually understood as a reward for improvements in 
productivity, cost savings etc. Compared to profit-sharing, gain-sharing is more in light-of-sight 
of employees, who obtain the reward.
It is important to notice that financial group-based incentives have many similarities. Numer-
ous researchers, e.g. Weitzman and Kruse (1990, p. 109) understand these financial rewards 
as “generically more similar than different” and this is probably a reason why impact of these 
practices is often studied without sufficient differentiation between them. Such an approach may 
be useful at some level of analysis (e.g. at macroeconomic level), but harmful at another level (mi-
croeconomic) because it obscures important differences between various types of group-based 
rewards and between different types of profit-sharing plans (see chapter 5.3). Similar opinion 
is even more strongly expressed by Bougen, Ogden, and Outram (1988), who claimed that the 
term “profit-sharing” denotes number of diversely motivated and conceived managerial initia-
tives and therefore usefulness of discussions of undifferentiated schemes of profit-sharing may 
be challenged.
Profit-sharing is frequently researched together with employee stock ownership (or with other 
forms of equity sharing). Nevertheless we strongly agree with Weitzman’s opinion that profit-
sharing is conceptually different from ESOP and therefore although utilization of equity sharing 
is sometimes considered as inseparable component of profit-sharing, we see such approach as 
untenable.
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It is possible to sum up that profit-sharing and various forms of employee participation (both 
financial, e.g. profit-sharing, gain-sharing, employee ownership, personnel stock option plans 
and non-financial, e.g. employee involvement in decision making and continuous improvement 
practices) should be analyzed in their mutual relationships, but still as independent and separable 
components.
Our paper is divided into 7 chapters. After introduction comes chapter dedicated to the meth-
odology of research and then we provide a simple bibliometric analysis. Consequently, two ex-
tensive chapters address key individual topics (i.e. micro and macroeconomic effects of profit-
sharing). The penultimate chapter deals with the presence and properties of profit-sharing in 
the European countries. Finally, in the last chapter we discuss results, provide ideas for further 
research and make conclusions.
2. METHODOLOGY
To identify key articles and authors dealing with the topic of profit-sharing, we utilized ISI Web 
of Knowledge (WoK) as our primary data source. Specifically, we were searching for all articles 
(in this text we use the term “article” for all kinds of published information), which in their topic 
(i.e. title, abstract or keywords) contained phrase “profit sharing” or phrase “profit related pay”. 
For the sake of precision, we add that in our search query we did not use quotation marks, but 
operator “near” between words in the both phrases. We obtained 2 141 results and to narrow the 
scope of our review we applied selection criteria described below. 
Firstly, the number of citations (field “TC”) of these articles was used as selection criterion; 
excluded were all articles with 0 citations. Secondly, titles and abstracts of the articles which 
succeeded in the previous test were checked and only articles in English dealing with sharing of 
profit between an organization and its workforce were included into further analysis. Excluded 
were articles dealing with profit-sharing between companies and in supply chains, articles of the 
type “book review”, articles dealing with non-profit organizations and articles from the area of 
health care. After this process we ended up with 205 articles. Solely these articles were used for 
literature analysis in chapter 3 and also served as a basis for the rest of this paper. To avoid miss-
ing important literature, in chapters 4-7 we allowed ourselves to utilize also additional sources, 
e.g. books and articles included in reference lists of our “basic” articles and exceptionally also 
other literature, which we considered to be of high importance.
Based on our knowledge of the topic, we believe that in result our paper covers key aspects of 
profit-sharing and thus constitutes up-to-date and comprehensive source of information on the 
subject.
3. BASIC BIBLIOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF ARTICLES FROM  
    WEB OF KNOWLEDGE
In this chapter are presented results of a simple bibliometric analysis, which was conducted for 
articles selected by the procedure described in chapter 2. 
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3.1 Co-citation analysis of the most frequently cited articles
All relevant articles with more than 50 citations in the field “TC” (times cited) were put into a 
co-citation network to identify the main streams and topics of research and result can be found 
in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1 – Co-citation analysis of articles with more than 50 citations. Source: author’s own. 
For preparation of Fig. 1 we used software described in (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002). 
Size of nodes (i.e. articles) matches to the number of citations of a given article and thickness of 
lines between nodes matches to the number of co-citations between a given pair of articles; by 
visible line are connected articles, which are together cited at least 10 times.
Firstly, there are two relatively isolated articles. Article by Blanchflower, Oswald, and Sanfey 
(1996) addressed a specific topic – an idea that a rise in a sector’s profitability after some time 
leads to a rise in the long-run level of wages in that sector. Ichniowski and Shaw (1999) addressed 
a topic of simultaneous utilization of profit-sharing and other human resource practices (prob-
lem-solving teams, extensive orientation, training throughout employees’ careers, extensive in-
formation sharing, rotation across jobs and employment security) and concluded that concurrent 
adoption of these practices leads to a higher increase in productivity than adoption of only some 
of them.
Secondly, we can see a cluster consisting of articles (Weitzman, 1985), (Weitzman, 1987), (Blanch-
flower & Oswald, 1988) and (Wadhwani & Wall, 1990). The first three of these articles dealt 
mainly with macroeconomic consequences of profit-sharing. Whereas Weitzman highlighted 
positive effects of profit-sharing, Blanchflower and Oswald (1988) advocated that profit-shar-
ing should not obtain government subsidies because it does not provide positive consequences 
predicted by Weitzman (according to the empirical research used in the article by Blanchflower 
and Oswald firms with profit-sharing scheme did not outperform non-adopters neither in finan-
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cial performance nor in the employment growth and industrial relations). Wadhwani and Wall 
(1990) investigated the impact of profit-sharing on employment and on productivity on the basis 
of microdata from the United Kingdom and concluded that whereas there is some evidence of 
positive impact on productivity, no positive influence on the employment was found.
Finally, the rest of articles is dedicated to microeconomic aspects of profit-sharing. Definitely, 
central both from the viewpoint of number of its citations (375) and frequency of co-citations 
with other articles is paper by Kandel and Lazear (1992), which dealt with overcoming the prob-
lem of free-rider and is a cornerstone of other articles on this topic (see also chapter 5.4). Articles 
(Doucouliagos, 1995) and (Weitzman & Kruse, 1990) provided meta-analytic review of empiri-
cal articles on productivity impacts of profit-sharing. Similarly Jones and Kato (1995) addressed 
productivity impact of profit-sharing in Japan. Impact on productivity is examined also in an 
experimental study by Nalbantian and Schotter (1997), where can be also found valuable meth-
odological comments. Finally, Drago, and Garvey (1998) dealt with impact of various techniques 
(including profit-sharing) on helping efforts and concluded that profit-sharing has “little ef-
fect”. Cooke (1994) examined (among other) impact of union representation on group-based 
incentives in improving firm performance and concluded that profit-sharing and gain-sharing 
contributed substantially more to performance in nonunion firms than in unionized firms. Fit-
zroy and Kraft (1987) hypothesized that appropriate group incentives may encourage coop-
eration and consequently productivity and profitability and their empirical research confirmed 
this hypothesis. Nevertheless Fitzroy and Kraft (1987, p. 34) also remarked that cross-sectional 
research cannot answer questions of causality and that more detailed longitudinal research and 
case studies are needed.
We adopt classification of articles into two domains (macroeconomics, microeconomics) in the 
rest of this paper. Obviously, this distinction is first and foremost of methodological nature, 
because microeconomic and macroeconomic consequences of profit-sharing are mutually tightly 
related. The main topics of articles analyzed in this chapter (impact of profit-sharing on various 
areas of firm performance, important contextual factors, and problems of profit-sharing like 
free-riding) together with types of profit-sharing are also used for structuring of chapter 5.
3.2 Analysis according to the number of citations of individual authors
For individual authors in our dataset was counted the number of citations of their articles. For 
every article were taken into account all its authors, that is all authors of a given article were ac-
credited a given number of citations. Similarly, absolute number of articles written by individual 
authors was counted. Consequently authors were sorted in descending order and in Tab. 1 are 
enlisted first ten most cited authors as well as 10 authors with the highest number of articles.
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Tab. 1 – Analysis of authors according to the number of citation and according to the number of 
articles. Source: own analysis based on data from ISI Web of Knowledge.
Analysis according to number of citations  
in ISI WoK
Analysis according to number of articles 
with at least 1 citation in ISI Wok
Author
Number of 
citations
Citations 
per article
Author
Number 
of articles
Kandel, Eugene 375 375.00 Kruse, Douglas 8
Lazear, Edward P. 375 375.00 Wilson, Nicholas 8
Weitzman, Martin L. 281 70.25 Poutsma, Erik 7
Kruse, Douglas 212 26.50 Kraft, Kornelius 6
Blanchflower, David G. 212 70.67 Heywood, John S. 6
Oswald, Andrew J. 212 70.67 Jones, Derek C. 5
Jones, Derek C. 152 30.40 Florkowski, Gary W. 5
Kraft, Kornelius 136 22.67 Weitzman, Martin L.; 
Fitzroy, Felix R.;  
Wadhwani, Sushil;  
Cable, John;  
Jirjahn, Uwe; 
Long, Richard J.
4
Wilson, Nicholas 134 16.75
Sanfey, Peter 131 131.00
4. MACROECONOMIC ASPECTS OF PROFIT-SHARING
Macroeconomic aspects of profit-sharing gained importance after publication of Weitzman’s 
works, e.g. (1983, 1984, 1985, 1987) and (Weitzman & Kruse, 1990), which emphasized positive 
effects of share system both at macroeconomic and microeconomic levels.
Weitzman (1983, p. 763) pointed out that “macroeconomic policies are much too aggregative to 
get at the heart of the stagflation problem” and presented theoretical reasons in support of thesis 
that stagflation can be effectively addressed by widespread implementation of remuneration sys-
tem based on profit-sharing. Moreover Weitzman asserted that widespread profit-sharing leads 
to full employment, see e.g. (Weitzman, 1983, p. 779). Concept of profit-sharing was further 
developed in a book (Weitzman, 1984) and also in the above mentioned series of articles.
Weitzman (1987) claimed that rational insiders (high-seniority employees) would prefer fixed 
wage payment to a profit-sharing because under profit-sharing the firm has motivation to hire 
outsiders and thus lower the pay of insiders. Therefore measures to promote widespread profit-
sharing (including subsidies and other public policy actions) are necessary.
Weitzman’s articles started an avalanche of theoretical literature dedicated to the analysis of 
effects of profit-sharing on employment (and other economic variables) and to the comparison 
of profit-sharing systems to fixed wage systems in various settings (e.g. monopoly, Cournot 
oligopoly, simple duopoly etc.). Last but not least, Weitzman’s theoretical works also had strong 
impact on real-world policies (see chapter 6).
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Skeptical about positive impact of profit-sharing and especially about rationality of governmen-
tal subsidies in favor of profit-sharing were e.g. Blanchflower and Oswald (1987), Nuti (1987), 
as well as Estrin, Grout, and Wadhwani (1987). The topic of policy support is central also for 
articles (Florkowski, 1991), (Kruse, 1994), (Mitchell, 1995) and is often discussed also in works 
dedicated to the analysis of utilization of profit-sharing in various countries (see chapter 6). On 
the other hand, many other researchers in their articles accepted Weitzman’s views. For exam-
ple Jerger and Michaelis (1999, p. 257) claimed that switch from fixed wage economy to share 
economy results in lower aggregate unemployment.
We could continue on and on with presentation of theoretical models and counter-models and 
it would be highly useful to test macroeconomic theories empirically. Unfortunately, empiri-
cal evidence of economy-wide implementation of profit-sharing is not readily available because 
profit-sharing has never been implemented in such extent in any country. Even Weitzman’s 
favorite example of economy-wide utilization of profit-sharing in Japan was questioned. For 
example, widespread utilization of profit-sharing was challenged in Kato and Morishima (2003), 
who found that profit-sharing plan was implemented only in one of four publicly traded firms 
(only bonus payment systems with a formal contract stipulating the presence of the profit-shar-
ing were taken into account). Another critique of Japan’s example gave Wadhwani (1987), who 
questioned numerous positive effects of profit-sharing including impact on stagflation. A more 
in-depth analysis of evolution of Japanese remuneration system can be found in Conrad (2010). 
Anyway, it is possible to say that there are not enough empirical data for reliable tests of conse-
quences of widespread profit-sharing.
Up-to-date analysis of the reasons why profit-sharing is not more widespread in practice despite 
the fact that from the theoretical viewpoint it usually has positive or neutral impact on macr-
oeconomic indicators is given e.g. in (Jerger & Michaelis, 2011). Another (microeconomic) expla-
nation of relatively weak incidence of profit-sharing is given in Hollander and Lacroix (1986) and 
is based on a claim that the main obstacle to widespread implementation of profit-sharing consist 
in reluctance of employers to share information about profits with employees.
5. MICROECONOMIC AND MANAGERIAL VIEW
Next to the macroeconomic impacts, profit-sharing has important microeconomic consequenc-
es. Generally, there are numerous possible organizational effects of profit-sharing, some of 
which are positive and some neutral or even negative. Our aim in this chapter is to classify and 
summarize these effects and related issues.
From the microeconomic viewpoint, the most important areas of research are represented by:
expected microeconomic effects of profit-sharing and empirical testing of occurrence of 
these effects, 
key contextual factors (type of workforce covered by profit-sharing plans, interactions of 
profit-sharing with other managerial techniques and with other forms of rewards for per-
formance, impact of trade unions etc.),
identification of various types of profit-sharing,
possible drawbacks of profit-sharing and empirical research into their occurrence.




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5.1 Microeconomic effects of profit-sharing
Before proceeding to the analysis of impacts of profit-sharing, we want to make two remarks. 
Firstly, it is of extreme importance to notice that in this chapter we address possible effects of 
profit-sharing sequentially and we only sporadically explicitly mention their mutual interactions. 
At the same time, we are aware of the fact that these effects constitute very complex network 
and it is often difficult to unambiguously set direction of their causality. Secondly, although we 
give here various possible consequences of profit-sharing, in individual cases is implementation 
of profit-sharing usually connected with effort to accomplish specific goals and design of profit-
sharing plan should be in accord with those goals.
According to Matthews (1989, p. 440-443) motives for profit-sharing may be divided to the busi-
ness motives, political motives and philanthropic motives. Kruse (1994, p. 440) proposed that 
while ideological reasons were prevailing in 1800s, current interest is tied to the direct economic 
benefits.
The effects can be also divided to “final effects” and “intermediate effects”. Among final effects 
can be included improvement in productivity and profitability (or generally in financial perform-
ance). Clearly, a question arises why profit-sharing should increase productivity. A straightfor-
ward answer is that the rise in productivity is reached by making part of an employees’ income 
dependent on performance and thus motivating them to increase effort. Nevertheless it seems 
that such an opinion is oversimplification. Firstly, there is a famous free-rider problem (see 
also chapter 5.4). Secondly, it seems that there are some impacts of profit-sharing that cannot 
be explained by this mechanism. Contemporary mainstream view is that profit-sharing influ-
ences productivity potentially throughout multiple channels and thus we also address the main 
“intermediate effects” (e.g. increasing skills of workforce, increasing the flow of information 
throughout the organization etc.) in this chapter. It is important to point out that from a theo-
retical viewpoint, profit-sharing may have positive, negative or neutral impact on the mentioned 
areas and empirical research is needed to find out whether and under which conditions positive 
impacts of profit-sharing occur and by which mechanisms they come into effect. The following 
paragraphs deal primarily with results of empirical research into consequences of profit-sharing. 
These include productivity and financial performance, employment (both employment stability 
and employment level), training, wages, attitudes of employees (affective organizational com-
mitment, trust in management, job attitudes, job satisfaction), behavioral effects (absenteeism 
and quits, support for policy changes and organizational citizenship behavior), relationships on 
workplace (with boss, with colleagues, helping efforts, industrial relations) and impact on truth-
ful reporting.
The most thoroughly is researched the impact of profit-sharing on productivity, substantially 
fewer studies are dedicated to the financial effects. It is fair to say that in case of financial ef-
fects (e.g. impact on profit) may emerge difficulties with establishing the direction of causality, 
i.e. whether profitability is improved by profit-sharing or whether more intensive utilization of 
profit-sharing is a consequence of a high profitability (D’Art & Turner, 2004, p. 339). Studies 
dedicated to the productivity effects frequently suffer from several shortages and here we would 
like mention two such imperfections. Firstly, they often do not give information on the type of 
the examined profit-sharing plan (see also chapter 5.3). Secondly, there are significant differ-
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ences in methodology and quality of these studies and therefore all results must be considered 
carefully and only as indicative. 
We found four extensive meta-analyses of the empirical research into productivity or financial 
effects of profit-sharing.
Florkowski (1987, p. 623-626) in his meta-analysis classified studies into 2 categories (first group 
of studies addressed financial impact and the second group addressed attitudinal and behavioral 
impact of profit-sharing). Florkowski analyzed methodology of these studies and concluded that 
they suffer from serious methodological weaknesses. To improve the future research, Florkowski 
(1987, p. 626-633) suggested a new research framework, which can be considered to be very valu-
able output of his article. Another important methodological article on these problems was writ-
ten by Fitzroy and Kraft (1992).
Weitzman and Kruse (1990) provided meta-analysis of articles dealing with the impact of profit-
sharing on productivity. Their analysis covers five case studies, 21 published attitude surveys (6 
employee surveys and 15 employer surveys), 6 studies based on simple statistical methods and 
16 econometric studies on the relation between profit-sharing and productivity. For the sake of 
accuracy, it is important to notice that Weitzman and Kruse generally understand profit-sharing 
broadly and in their review are included group-based incentive plans including gain-sharing. As 
for econometric studies, Weitzman and Kruse (1990, p. 137-139) reported consistently positive 
results, nevertheless highlighted that econometric studies shed little light on the mechanism 
through which profit-sharing may affect productivity.
OECD (1995) gave a comprehensive review of empirical studies on the impact of profit-sharing 
on productivity. Again, methodological problems are emphasized and “remarkable consistency” 
of results (in sense of positive impact of profit-sharing on productivity) is confirmed.
Doucouliagos (1995) applied meta-analytic techniques to 43 studies and evaluated impact of 
various forms of employee participation (including profit-sharing) on productivity. According to 
this meta-analysis is profit-sharing positively associated with productivity and this association is 
stronger among labor-managed firms and capitalist firms with participatory management style.
We checked also results of several newer empirical studies, e.g. (D’Art & Turner, 2004) and 
(Akhtar, Ding, & Ge, 2008), and it is possible to say that they brought results similar to those, 
which were mentioned in the described four meta-analyses. Kraft and Ugarković (2006) ad-
dressed the impact of profit-sharing on financial performance and found a positive impact. 
Therefore we can sum up that although results of studies examining the impact of profit-sharing 
on productivity and profitability are ambiguous, in vast majority they report neutral or positive 
effect of profit-sharing.
Impact of profit-sharing on employment was researched with yet more ambiguous results. This 
impact can be divided into two areas – impact on employment stability and impact on higher 
levels of employment. Again, review of empirical research on this topic can be found in (OECD, 
1995, p. 160-164) and results are mixed (usually neutral or positive) in the both mentioned areas. 
Fundamental rejection of positive impact of profit-sharing on employment is given in (Wad-
hwani & Wall, 1990) because in this article is questioned Weitzman’s proposition that firms 
use base wage and not the total level of remuneration as the relevant marginal cost of labor. 
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Wadhwani and Wall (1990, p. 15) based on empirical data concluded that employers under profit-
sharing system really take the total level of remuneration and not base wage as the marginal cost 
of labor. Obviously, if this is correct, profit-sharing cannot provide employment stabilization. 
To enhance evidence given in (OECD, 1995, p. 160-164) we checked for additional studies on 
this topic, but we got a similar pattern of results. For example Azfar and Danninger (2001) based 
on analysis of data from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth on white men in nonunion jobs 
between 1988 and 1994 claimed that profit-sharing reduced turnover, which resulted in higher 
expected return to job-specific human capital investments for firms and therefore firms were 
motivated to increase job-training. This led to rise in productivity and also to rise in wages 
of workers. Similarly (Miller, Hom, & Gomez-Mejia, 2001) reported that according to their 
research in American-owned plants in Mexico profit-sharing reduced turnover. On the other 
hand, the newest and methodologically impressive (employed are both regression and matching 
methods) study on this topic by Bellmann and Möller (2010), proposed that positive effect of 
profit-sharing on employment stability could not be corroborated. 
Related topic to the impact on employment is the impact on training and this is explored e.g. 
in (Gielen, 2011) and (Green & Heywood, 2011). Gielen (2011) pointed out that there are two 
channels via which profit-sharing can increase training investments. The first channel is a direct 
one and works because profit-sharing is a type of performance related pay and as such motivates 
(or at least should motivate) workforce to put effort during training period as well as effectively 
utilize obtained training so that their productivity and wages increase. The second channel is an 
indirect one and works thanks to the mechanism described in the article by Azfar and Dannin-
ger (2001), see the previous paragraph. It is fair to say that this mechanism is more an assumption 
than a rule, because this impact is somewhat unsure (see the paragraph dedicated to the influence 
of profit-sharing on employment stability). Anyway, under the assumption that profit-sharing 
thanks to greater wage flexibility stabilizes employment (because wage of the employees auto-
matically declines in case of bad financial performance of the employer and thus employer is not 
forced to fire their employees), the second channel can really work.
An important article, which connects the topic described in the previous paragraph with impact 
of profit-sharing on wages is (Parent, 2004), where is expressed an important idea that job-spe-
cific training provided to employees is at least partially transferable across employers. According 
to Parent (2004) profit-sharing plan offered to an employee by previous employers had a strong 
positive impact on the current wage of this employee. Parent asserted that it is thanks to acquisi-
tion of skills, which are at least partially transferable across employers and skill acquisition is thus 
one of the channels by which profit-sharing increases performance.
Impact of profit-sharing on wages and total remuneration has not been researched extensively. 
OECD (1995, p. 162) remarked that the expectation that profit-sharing firms will keep higher 
level of employment than fixed-wage firms is based on two assumptions. Firstly, profit-shar-
ing firm consider base wage (not base wage plus profit-sharing bonus) to be marginal cost of 
labor. Secondly, the mentioned base wage is lower than the market wage. The question is to 
what extent profit-sharing bonuses replace part of the basic (fixed) remuneration in practice. 
Article by OECD (1995, p. 162) provided results of three studies, two of which reported neutral 
impact of profit-sharing on total remuneration (exact formulation used in the OECD report is 
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“profit-sharing payments tend to supplement basic wages”) and one reported that introduction 
of profit-sharing reduced labor cost growth. These results seem to us surprising. The most up-to 
date article on the discussed topic is according to our knowledge (Long & Fang, 2012), which 
in theoretical part gave ambiguous findings (mentioned are three articles reporting a positive 
impact of profit-sharing on employee earnings, one neutral and one article reporting negative 
impact of profit-sharing on employees earnings). Nevertheless Long and Fang (2012, p. 923) 
reported that their own research exposed a positive impact of profit-sharing on employee’s earn-
ings. We can conclude that further research into this topic is needed.
Impact of profit-sharing on various kinds of attitudes is examined in several studies. Affec-
tive organizational commitment and trust in management is addressed e.g. in (Coyle-Shapiro 
et al., 2002) and (Bayo-Moriones & Larraza-Kintana, 2009). Coyle-Shapiro et al. (2002, p. 424) 
found positive impact of profit-sharing on organizational commitment and suggested two pos-
sible explanations – one based on expectancy theory (individual capacity for contribution) and 
the second one based on theory of procedural justice (organizational reciprocity). Consequently 
(Coyle-Shapiro et al., 2002) suggested that some portion of the profit-sharing should be based 
on individual contribution to performance (to increase line-of-sight and strengthen feel of indi-
vidual contribution and reduce free-riding) and some portion should be based on years of service 
(to strengthen feel of justice). Bayo-Moriones and Larraza-Kintana (2009, p. 207) also found a 
positive impact of profit-sharing on affective commitment. Nevertheless they found that this in-
fluence depends on size of a firm and also on job-related employee participation; positive impact 
was greatest in small firms and also in firms with low job-related employee participation.
In this context it is important to mention that there is a growing literature, e.g. (Dohmen, Falk, 
Huffman, & Sunde, 2009), in which can be found assertion that reciprocity is a strong motiva-
tional drive. Hannan (2005) reported that workers response asymmetrically to firm profit, in 
the sense that they expected to share in firm profit increases but not decreases. Among other, 
Hannan (2005, p. 185) found that if firm’s profit had increased and wages were kept constant, 
employees decreased their effort. We conjecture that appropriate implementation of profit-shar-
ing may take advantage of these findings. 
Pouliakas (2010) examined the impact of the intensity of incentives on job satisfaction and con-
cluded that monetary incentives may have a positive effect on workers’ utility and performance 
as long as they are large enough, while small rewards have significantly negative association with 
the satisfaction. Employers should be therefore cautious with providing small incentives to their 
employees. 
Important behavioral effects of profit-sharing include impact on absenteeism and quits, impact on 
support for policy changes and impact on organizational citizenship behavior (OCB). Impact of 
profit-sharing on absenteeism and quits was investigated in (Wilson, Cable, & Peel, 1990), (Wilson 
& Peel, 1991) and (Brown, Fakhfakh, & Sessions, 1999) and all three articles (first two refer to the 
same empirical research) found positive impact. Chiu and Tsai (2007) explored the impact of prof-
it-sharing on OCB (that is behaviors that should support the broader organizational, social, and 
psychological environment in which the technical core must function) and concluded that while 
cash-based profit-sharing had no effect on OCB, combined-total profit-sharing and stock-based 
profit-sharing positively influenced OCB. It is therefore possible to sum up that the behavioral ef-
fects of profit-sharing were in all mentioned studies positive.
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Another area that can be influenced by utilization of profit-sharing are relationships on work-
place. We would like to highlight that the impact of profit-sharing on these relationships is am-
biguous and this topic is an example of the fact that utility of employees may both increase and 
decrease under this remuneration system. Because under profit-sharing earnings of an employee 
depend on productivity of his or her colleagues, there is an incentive for the employee to put 
effort into increasing the productivity of those co-workers. Heywood, Jirjahn, and Tsertsvadze 
(2005) gave an excellent overview of possible mechanisms by which this aim may be accom-
plished. Firstly, it is via helping-on-the-job and via increased cooperation, which is supposed to 
increase trust and job satisfaction. Secondly, it is via peer pressure and (horizontal) monitoring, 
which is supposed to exacerbate trust and job satisfaction. Heywood, Jirjahn, and Tsertsvadze 
(2005) reported that they encountered both positive and negative impact of profit-sharing on 
relationships among colleagues and concluded that the impact depends on circumstances and 
type of worker (e.g. profit-sharing has a positive effect on relationships among non-supervi-
sory males with lower commitment, but negative effect on relationships among supervisors and 
subordinates and on relationships among women with lower commitment). Drago and Garvey 
(1998) investigated the impact of various types of rewards and human resources practices (e.g. 
task variety) on helping efforts and concluded that while promotions incentives lead to decrease 
of helping efforts within work groups, profit-sharing and piece-rates had little effect. Impact of 
profit-sharing on relationships with a boss was addressed in (Green & Heywood, 2010). Because 
a boss has stronger tools to develop a pressure on subordinates than their peers, relationships 
with boss may under profit-sharing suffer yet more than relationships with peers. Green and 
Heywood (2010) ascertained that satisfaction with boss is lower among workforce under profit-
sharing.
Finally, impact of profit-sharing on trustful reporting from subordinate (divisional) managers to 
headquarters (in situation of interdependencies between multiple divisions of firm) is addressed 
in (Arnold, Ponick, & Schenk-Mathes, 2008). It is mentioned that traditional budgeting schemes 
provide incentives for managers to misrepresent information and to build slack into budgets 
and therefore various truth-inducing budgeting mechanisms have been proposed (Arnold et 
al., 2008, p. 38). Comparison of Groves mechanism (under which a manager’s compensation 
depends on his or her own division’s actual profit as well as on the expected profits that all other 
divisions report to headquarters ex ante) and a profit-sharing scheme (under which  a manager’s 
compensation depends on overall firm profit) is given and it is proposed that while Groves 
mechanism is theoretically superior to profit-sharing, in practice is for headquarters advanta-
geous profit-sharing because of possibility of communication between managers, which in case 
of Groves scheme leads to collusion strategies.
5.2 Key contextual factors (mutual interdependencies of profit-sharing with other 
managerial techniques and with other forms of rewards for performance, trade 
unions etc.)
Contextual factors (variables) influence both decision about adoption of profit-sharing and suc-
cess of the profit-sharing plan. In this chapter we want to provide a short overview of these 
variables and expected direction (i.e. positive or negative) of their impact both on adoption of 
profit-sharing and on firm performance. It is essential to highlight that results of empirical re-
search into the direction of impact of these contextual factors are often ambiguous.
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An overview of factors, which determine adoption of profit-sharing, can be found in (Kruse, 
1993, p. 148-150). Kruse asserted that prior research did not produce consistent findings, nev-
ertheless at least identified important variables related to the presence of profit-sharing. These 
variables include unionization, firm size, employee composition, firm growth, capital intensity 
and industry variability. Kruse in his own research addressed a question what factors predict the 
adoption of profit-sharing. According to Kruse, probability of profit-sharing adoption increases 
with rises in profit margins and stock prices, specifically rise in profit margin appears to be 
most important for prediction of adoption of cash-based plans and rise in stock prices appears 
to be most important for prediction of adoption of deferred plans. In this regard Kruse chal-
lenged methodological correctness of cross-sectional analyses in which are compared perform-
ance measures of profit-sharing firms with measures of non-profit-sharing firms and pointed 
out to the fact that if higher profits help predict adoption of profit-sharing plans, then logically 
profit-sharing companies outperform non-profit-sharing ones (that is direction of causality may 
be opposite). Kruse found only weak support for the hypothesis that profit-sharing adoption can 
be predicted by increased variability of company sales or profits. Finally, union presence showed 
up as a predictor of profit-sharing adoption (especially of cash-based plans). In the rest of this 
chapter we try to update and expand Kruse’s analysis.
Numerous articles address the impact of unionization on adoption as well as on productivity ef-
fects of profit-sharing. Results are totally mixed and thus we do not deal with this topic in-detail 
here.
Ogden (1992) pointed out that a serious obstacle to the widespread utilization of profit-sharing 
may be reluctance of employers to share financial information with their employees (e.g. because 
of possible claims of employees on greater influence on their company).
The influence of firm size on adoption of profit-sharing was addressed e.g. in Heywood and 
Jirjahn (2009). On the one hand, increase in firm size may increase the issue of possible free 
riding. On the other hand this is not always true. Heywood and Jirjahn (2009) asserted that firm 
size is associated with reduced profit-sharing in case of independent worker productivity, but not 
in case of interdependent worker productivity. In this regard, it is possible to say that nature of 
production process is another important contextual factor. Relation of firm size and profit-shar-
ing can be found also in numerous other studies, especially in the ones dedicated to the problem 
of free-riding (see chapter 5.4).
Relations of profit-sharing and gender were examined e.g. in Jones, Kalmi, and Kauhanen (2010, 
p. 622) and in many other studies. Although these studies vary in their main topic, it is often 
found that gender has influence on probability of adoption of profit-sharing as well as on its 
impacts.
Very broad and relatively under-researched topic is the interdependence and complementarity 
of profit-sharing and other human resources management techniques (including other types of 
rewards for performance and various kinds of non-financial participation). For example Nalba-
tian and Schotter (1997) in their experimental study examined the impact of various group-based 
incentive schemes on level of effort and productivity. Cable (1988) addressed mutual relation-
ship between financial and non-financial participation and concluded that between firms that 
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adopt non-financial participation (i.e. participation in control) and firms that adopt financial 
participation were substantial differences and that these two kinds of participation are often 
used separately.
Finally, it is fair to mention that another important factor with strong influence on adoption of 
profit-sharing is external environment, especially public policies (subsidies, tax policy, protec-
tion of employees etc.). Florkowski (1991) reported that there is a great variety of approaches to 
profit-sharing among nations. Marsden and Belfield (2010) examined influence of stronger em-
ployment protection and government fiscal incentives in favor of profit-sharing on spread of this 
type of rewards. On the basis of comparison of data from France and Britain is concluded that 
higher employment protection and higher incentives for profit-sharing (both exist in France) 
lead to a more widespread utilization of this type of reward. It is possible to sum up that majority 
of literature dealing with utilization of profit-sharing in various countries claims that adoption 
of profit-sharing strongly depends on support provided by public policies. This may imply that 
profit-sharing by itself is not attractive for employers. Nevertheless there are also important 
exceptions. For example, government intervention in favor of profit-sharing was not present in 
Japan and yet, Japan is a prominent example of country with high utilization of profit-sharing.
5.3 Types of profit-sharing plans (design of profit-sharing)
By the term “types of profit-sharing plans” we understand important characteristics of these 
plans. It is above the scope of this paper to deal with this topic in detail, but we want to provide 
an overview of crucial elements of profit-sharing plan design. These according to our opinion 
include:
Goal of profit-sharing, i.e. “why” profit-sharing is implemented in a given company.
Form, in which are rewards paid.
Proportion of the employees covered by profit-sharing plan.
Formula according to which is reward distributed to individual employees including answers 
to the following questions:
Should be the amount of reward influenced only by a formula, left at discretion of manag-
ers or depend on a combination of these possibilities? 
From which information system (e.g. financial accounting, managerial accounting) should 
be obtained data for evaluation of the results of the formula?
In which form should be reward distributed to employees (cash or another)?
What should be basis of distribution (e.g. proportionate to salary; equal profit-shares for 
all employees under profit-sharing plan; according to length of service; combination of 
methods)?
Should profit-sharing take into account individual performance?
Should the formula be target-based or relative? 
How long should be the period for which is the formula evaluated?
How often should be the formula evaluated?












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Timing and frequency in which are rewards paid.
Concurrent use of profit-sharing with other types of performance-related rewards.
Importance of rewards based on profit-sharing plans in relation to fixed part of income or 
more generally relative importance of (planned) variable rewards in relation to fixed part of 
income.
It is possible to say that individual implementations of profit-sharing plans vary greatly in the 
mentioned characteristics and it is above the scope of this paper to address these problems 
in-detail. We propose that fit-for-all solution does not exist, because design of the plan should 
foremost respect goal which is pursued by profit-sharing plan implementation.
In literature is as a main classification criterion usually used form of rewards. According to 
this criterion it is possible to distinguish cash-based rewards and share-based rewards. Under 
cash-based profit-sharing plans are rewards paid via cash payments and under share-based plans 
employees acquire shares of the company (for which they work) free of charge or substantially 
cheaper than is market price of the shares. While payment in shares may foster long-term behav-
ior of employees, it may be sub-optimal from the viewpoint of allocation of employees’ capital 
(see also chapter 5.4). It is also possible to combine cash-based and share-based rewards. Defi-
nitely, it can be reasonably expected that different forms of providing reward will have different 
impact on employees’ behavior.
According to the timing of the payment it is possible to differentiate immediate payments (the 
reward is paid immediately or in short time after decision about reward) and deferred payments. 
Again, impact of these payment methods on employees’ attitudes and behavior can be expected 
to be distinct. 
5.4 Supposed drawbacks of profit-sharing and their possible solutions
Firstly, possible drawbacks of profit-sharing follow from the fact that the impacts of profit-shar-
ing may be both positive and negative and in this sense we discussed them already in chapter 5.1. 
Secondly, there are some other specific problems that will be shortly addressed in this chapter. 
Extensive recapitulation of drawbacks of profit-sharing can be found e.g. in (Blanchflower & Os-
wald, 1987, p. 5) and if we select the microeconomic ones, we get the following list: profit-sharing 
exposes workers to a significant amount of income risk; unions that agree to profit-sharing are 
likely to want some control of the workplace; it seems undesirable to encourage workers to invest 
financial capital in their own firms’ shares, because their human capital is already tied up in the 
enterprise and risk averse workers prefer a diversified portfolio. It is difficult to fully deny these 
objections, nevertheless it is obvious that mentioned issues may be solved e.g. by an appropriate 
design of profit-sharing plan or by implementation of participative management style. 
The single most important issue is probably the one known as “free-riding”. Shortly, free-riding 
emerges because under profit-sharing an employee bears the full cost of their effort but gets 1/n 
(where n is number of employees under profit-sharing) of the benefit and therefore the employee 
may be tempted to shirk under such a scheme and “free-ride”. 



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In literature were proposed various mechanisms for overcoming this problem (peer pressure, 
mutual monitoring, building of team spirit to foster inner pressure, utilization of inter-team 
competition, taking into account dependence of free riding on production function, design of 
profit-sharing scheme etc.). The most influential work on this topic, which serves as a start-
ing point or at least as a point of reference of other articles, is (Kandel & Lazear, 1992), where 
is deployed a formalized model to analyze free riding. Marino and Zábojník (2004) examined 
whether free riding will be stronger in large companies and they asserted that free-riding in 
teams can be solved by creating internal competition between teams (profit-sharing combined 
with inter-team tournament). Adams (2006) examined conditions under which is free riding 
likely to occur and ascertained that probability of free riding substantially depends on the type of 
production function (the more is level of effort of each worker separable from the effort of other 
workers, the more probable is free riding) and optimal incentive scheme therefore may involve 
firm-wide incentives (e.g. profit-sharing) even in large firms if effort levels are complementary. 
Coyle-Shapiro et al. (2002) proposed to utilize measures of individual performance to suppress 
temptation to free riding.
6. PRESENCE AND PROPERTIES OF PROFIT-SHARING  
    IN THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
Although description of utilization of profit-sharing across different countries is not a central 
topic of this paper, we give here an overview of relevant literature, especially because of the fact 
that according to our findings this kinds of articles tends to include details on design and deter-
minants of the incidence of profit-sharing plans, recommendations for public policy and other 
useful summary information.
European context of profit-sharing is relatively strongly covered e.g. in articles (Uvalic, 1993), 
(Poutsma & de Nijs, 2003) and (Welz & Fernández-Macías, 2008). Outlook of profit-sharing in 
OECD countries can be found in (OECD, 1995).
Up-to-date review and empirical research in Finnish manufacturing companies can be found 
in (Jones, Kalmi, Kato, & Mäkinen, 2012), financial participation in Estonia is described in 
(Eamets, Mygind, & Spitsa, 2008) and situation in Ireland is addressed in (D’Art & Turner, 
2006), where is used an historical approach and cyclical and contingent nature of profit-sharing 
is found. A historical approach to the study of profit-sharing can be found in a series of articles 
from Great Britain by Perks (1982), Matthews (1988, 1989), Hatton (1988) and Mills (1991). Quite 
interestingly, historians are usually skeptical about positive impacts of profit-sharing, neverthe-
less there are also exceptions. For example Bougen et al. (1988) gave examples of successful 
profit-sharing implementations from history and pointed out that the term “profit-sharing” is 
used for very different schemes and that profit-sharing is not necessarily linked with any one 
particular management strategy (e.g. with participative management style).
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7. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS, IDEAS FOR FURTHER  
    RESEARCH AND CONCLUSION
In our paper we presented a comprehensive overview of key factors, which are relevant for suc-
cessful implementation of profit-sharing plan. It was showed that profit-sharing may serve as a 
tool for increasing competitiveness (e.g. by increasing cooperation, effort and productivity), but 
it can be also harmful when incorrectly implemented. 
Existing research substantially expanded our knowledge about profit-sharing. Furthermore, 
possible imperfections in research methodology were identified and improved research methods 
were suggested e.g. in Florkowski (1987) and Fitzroy and Kraft (1992).
It seems that large-scale research brought important results and ideas, but suffers from prob-
lems with availability and quality of data, insufficient differentiation between various types of 
group-based incentive plans and as for impact of these plans on productivity can therefore be 
considered to be only indicative. For in-depth study of profit-sharing plans, e.g. with regard to 
the successfulness of various types of profit-sharing, can therefore be more appropriate experi-
mental research, (long-time) case studies, or econometric case studies, see e.g. Jones, Kalmi, and 
Kauhanen (2010).
We also agree with (Coyle-Shapiro et al., 2002, p. 424), who pointed out that there is relatively 
small body of inquiry into the effects of profit-sharing on employee attitudes and behavior. 
Heywood, Jirjahn, and Tsertsvadze (2005, p. 572) proposed that important topic for the future 
research is effect of profit-sharing on job satisfaction. It is possible to add, that simultaneous 
research into attitudes of employers may be useful. Similarly Pouliakas and Theodossiou (2012, 
p. 1248) concluded that the economic literature has not paid sufficient attention to perceptions 
of employees regarding the effectiveness of various incentives in enhancing their effort, which 
is an important link of the incentives-productivity chain. 
Last but not least, surprisingly under-researched is also impact of profit-sharing on total remu-
neration and mutual interactions of profit-sharing with other types of rewards for perform-
ance.
Based on the facts presented in this paper we assert that although a lot of work has been done 
in the area of research on profit-sharing, a lot more should be done yet. It is especially because 
of the fact that results of the existing research are often ambiguous and more detailed, in-depth 
studies are needed.
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